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Abstract. A particular aspect of Juri Lotman’s semiotic theory is, without a doubt, 
the acknowledgment of the impossibility of adopting a single scientifi c language 
for the comprehension of processes underlying cultural dynamics. In his last work, 
Unpredictable Mechanisms of Culture, Lotman underscores that natural sciences and 
humanities have to search for the unity of the incompatible through a profound 
meta-linguistic dialogue. Th is can happen only considering the reality in its anti-
nomies, or as informed by a plurality of languages reciprocally aimed to express the 
real movement of objects – a hetero geneous and contradictory movement: hence, 
Lotman’s suggestion (which is also his ethical legacy) that the Aristotelian poly-
hedral unity of science be returned to. Th e aim of this paper is to retrace Lotman’s 
relationship with the ideas of science, scientifi city and interdisciplinary method, 
stressing his last refl ections concerning the urgency of returning to the Aristotelian 
unifi ed structure of knowledge, or a form of knowledge in which diff erent and never 
completely mutually translatable scientifi c languages coexist autonomously, while 
being in a dialogue. 
Keywords: Juri Lotman, Gott fried Leibniz, scientifi c knowledge, oneness, inter-
disciplinarity, monad.
The unpredictable unity of diff erences
From its European beginnings, the science of semiotics came to be placed almost 
naturally in an interdisciplinary knowledge horizon which saw, on the one hand, 
the establishment of synchronic linguistics in the 1910–1920s and, on the other 
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hand, the emergence of structural anthropology in the 1940–1950s. With its for-
mal structure and its analytical method, the so-called generative semiotics thus be-
came a model for the Soviet branch (e.g., Simpozium po strukturnomu izucheniju 
znakovyh sistem in 1962, which was the fi rst offi  cial semiotic meeting in the Soviet 
Union) emphasizing a mathematically objective approach in the study of language. 
Inclined, however, towards a unifying (and typically Russian) outlook, Soviet 
semiotics tried from the outset not to adopt a fragmented vision of the world but 
instead att empted to create a bridge between the sciences and the humanities, over 
time going beyond the generative method – which remained an important base 
anyway. Th is att empt, which pointed to a unity based on an unbiased dialogue of 
scholarly perspectives, was initially achieved through a methodological trust in the 
hard sciences, a seemingly more objective and legitimate foundation for scholarly 
discourse (Lot man 1967: 107). From this perspective, a key role was played by the 
fascination that the Soviets felt with American cybernetics and logical empiricism, 
both of which transmitt ed the idea of  a science founded on an objective (collective 
and individual) reason1 – so without a Subject, in the manner of the anthro pological 
school of Lévi-Strauss.
Only thirty years later, one of the main exponent of the so-called Tartu-Moscow 
School of Semiotics, Juri Lotman, defi nitively rejected this “engineering” model of 
the semiotic study of reality, proposing an approach based on scientifi c polyglotism, 
seen not as an epistemological lack of systematization and unifi cation, but as the very 
nature of science that, like art, is both one and polyhedral2 – art that, let us bear in 
mind, in Lotman’s vision has always been the language paradigm of cultural dynamics. 
Th is approach is dictated by the fact that “just as diff erent sciences comprehend 
diff erent aspects of life and cannot be replaced by a single universal science, so 
diff erent art forms create diff erent mutually untranslatable images of reality” (Lotman 
1994[1993]: 46–47). According to Lotman, in other words, interdisciplinarity is the 
path through which it is possible to obtain a complex vision of reality.
On the last page of his last, posthumous theoretical elaboration, Un predictable 
Mechanisms of Culture (1993), Lotman (1994[1993]: 106) clearly states:  
Th e path on which science now fi nds itself opens up a unifi ed perspective on the 
knowledge contained in various fi elds. In place of individual methods for the 
study of the biological or social, physical or historical aspects of the world that 
1 A logical-rational “I”. 
2 Th is change of perspective is linked to the theoretical elaboration of the concept of 
“semiosphere” (1984), that is to say the immersive semiotic space in which man is in-formed, 
which is composed of infi nite bundles of meaning in (real or potential) relationships of 
translation. Th is complex vision of culture inevitably results in a unitas-multiplex of languages 
(polyglotism) and in an epistemology of boundary, expressed by interdisciplinary dialogue.  
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surrounds us, we are returning once again to the issues that worried Aristotle 
and the scholars of the Middle Ages: the unifi ed structure of scientifi c knowledge. 
Along this path we encounter a fundamental problem: the relation ship between 
the individual and the general. (Lotman 1994[1993]: 106) 
In the fi rst part of this paper, I will outline a brief genesis of the concept of the unifi ed 
structure of scientifi c knowledge, namely of the relationship that links multiple and 
autonomous ways of understanding to the concept of universum. In the second part 
I will clarify the meaning of interdisciplinarity, an idea which, according to Lotman, 
should never become a “Tower of Babel” of human knowledge, but rather should 
rise up as a complex structure in which the individual and the general interpenetrate 
each other, thereby creating a prismatic unity. 
Towards a vision of the oneness of reality
Th e need to give unity and coherence to intellectual experience has always been 
present in humans. Archetypical examples of this are the foundational myths, 
elaborated by man in order to explain the harmony3 that seems to envelop him 
and reveals itself through the cosmological order.4 Classical culture with its idea of 
polis5 and Christian-medieval culture with its great theolo gical summae are the fi rst 
4 Hans Urs von Balthasar (1998[1961–1969]: 147–148) writes: “Th e world of myth was 
fundamentally dialogical: from the personal-divine sphere, glory radiates upon man who dares 
to interpret his temporal existence in this light. […] It wasn’t possible a becoming of myths by 
the understanding. […] Th e knowledge is that through which man owns in himself the criteria 
of the verifi cation, in his own reason”.
 See also Lotman and Uspenskij’s “Myths – name – culture” (1973), in which they under-
line that mythological thought does not manifest a rational segmentation of reality (expressed 
by logical-mathematic coordinates of time and space), but rather an immersion/mirroring of a 
subject in the whole of the world, according to the isomorphic principle.     
5 Th e Greek political community, that provided civic order and required a precise behavioural 
ethos, was founded on concord, i.e., on the idea of unity in the diversity. Concord refers to 
the sense of a co-belonging characteristic of the polis. It looks for the agreement of diff erent 
opinions and not solely for their identity. Th is socio-cultural model founded on community, 
which was destroyed in the 17th century, must be taken into account by the political theories 
that are constructed upon the concept of the individual in order to understand whence the 
Western dichotomy between the universal and the individual derives. Lotman dedicates many 
illuminating pages of his Unpredictable Mechanisms of Culture to this polarization, stressing the 
3 Th e word “harmony”, from Greek harmonia, means disposition, proportion, and it derives 
from harmozein: to connect, to link.
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complete expressions of this need that later becomes the study of a polymath model 
of consciousness and of man himself (the so-called Universalgelehrte). Th is study 
aims at the harmonization and integration of the rational-scientifi c vision of the 
world with the philosophical one.
During the Middle Ages, under the infl uence of the Aristotelian revival of Th omas 
Aquinas, an integration of knowledge was att empted under the meta-knowledge of 
theology; also, foundations were laid to the idea of university as a place of communal 
dialogue among various disciplines – an idea that was later fully developed by 
Renaissance anthropocentrism. 
While on the one hand, this operation of interdisciplinary integration during 
modernity, through the rationalism of the Enlightenment, was completed by the 
writing of great encyclopedias, on the other hand there was a progressive detach-
ment of scientifi c rationality from sophia (or wisdom) that began to assert itself – 
giving life to what, in the contemporary epoch, comes to be the sharp dichotomy 
between the natural sciences and the humanities. During the 17th and 18th centuries 
a steady compartmentalization of the research methods of various disciplinary 
branches could be observed. Th e increasing depth and breadth of understanding 
of these disciplines, fi rst at a cosmological level and then at the anthropological and 
the biological levels, begins to make the returning of such knowledge to a single 
coherent and unifi ed framework – the theological one – more diffi  cult.    
Although this leads to a fruitful and incremental specialization of human under-
standing in all its nuances, it also leads to a greater autonomy and fragmen tation of 
the sciences. In modernity, knowledge, once represented as a tree with many branches 
(always, however, joined by the unity of the intellectual experience: the trunk), 
becomes a proliferation of worlds, separate, divided and impenetrable to one another.6 
In this context, a fi gure of particular interest stands out, namely that of Gott fried 
W. Leibniz, one of the last Universalgelehrte7 of modernity and an inspiring infl uence 
for Lotman. In the footsteps of Aristotle, Th omas Aquinas and the Scholastics, 
Leibniz suggests a model of knowledge in which the multiplicity of understandings 
semiotic diff erence between collectivism (the “all whole”, i.e. the degeneration of the community 
of the polis) and individualism (the “all individual”).       
6 However, modernity reveals att empts of systematization, especially on the speculative level, 
and makes it both from the rationalist angle, assigning it to the unifi cation of method (fi rst with 
Descartes and then with Kant), and from the idealist angle, leaving to Spirit, Reason or History 
the task to reveal the role of parts within the whole: the knowledge is “one” because the spirit, the 
reason and the history are “one”. Th at is to say modernity creates the conceptual premises, easily 
declining in praxis, of an idea of unity where diff erences are reset to zero, rather than kept, an idea 
that was strongly deconstructed by Lotman in his last works. 
7 Th anks to his eclecticism, in 1725 Leibniz was invited by Peter the Great to lay the foundations 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
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has always to be founded on and anchored to the intellectual and moral unity of the 
“person”, who is the integral experience of reality. Th e philosophical assumption of 
this model lies in the concept of the “monad”, that is to say “what is one,” a concept 
essential to Lotmanian semiotics.  
Th e monad is the fundamental metaphysical reality of which the entire universe 
is made. Monads are simple, individual, unextended, self-suffi  cient substances 
expressing the primary unity of all things – or God, from whom they derive (Leibniz 
1989a, theses 1–2; Leibniz 1989b, theses 54–65). In turn, each monad is a perpetual 
living “mirror” or image of the whole universe, whose primitive and necessary 
principle and ultimate reason is God. Each refl ects in its particularity, from its own 
point of view, the entire universe (or the perfect harmony of divine design) and is 
in perfect interconnection, agreement and oneness with the refl ections of all other 
monads (Leibniz 1989a, theses 12–13; 1989b, theses 54–65). In each of these 
“metaphysical atoms”, constituting the wholeness of reality, the multiplicity of the 
universe is led back to unity, or rather compensated for by the oneness of the identity 
(diversitas identitate compensata). 
By virtue of the utt er likeness of monads mirroring the universe that keeps 
them all in an interlinked wholeness, the Leibnizian conception of knowledge is 
understood as encyclopedic and analogical.8 It is encyclopedic because it is unitary 
even in its heterogeneity; and it is analogical because it endures due to proportional 
relationships of uni-similarity among the diff erent ways of understanding of reality, 
refl ections of the monads’ various points of view. It is, moreover, a knowledge that 
tends to the principle of the best, in accordance with the perfection of its Generator.9 
In spite of its speculative and heuristic fruitfulness, this complex vision of 
knowledge has, litt le by litt le, been lost. As said earlier, in the contemporary epoch 
the progressive (and legitimate) specialization of disciplines has been corroborated, 
leading at the same time to a fundamental self-referentiality of their epistemological 
foundations and creating an extremely fragmented universe of sciences. However, 
in the past decades there has been much discussion about a diff erent approach 
to knowledge as a way able to explain the gnoseologic tension of the human 
intellectual unity and the increasing complexity of the descriptions of reality – a 
reality which is plural-integral and has to be expressible in scientifi c terms. Karl 
Jaspers (1989[1923]: 21) wrote about this:     
8  Th e origin of the word “analogy”, as suggested by its Greek root analogia, is founded on the 
mathematic concept of “proportion” (a : b = c : d), which states a similarity due to an equality of 
relationships. 
9 Monads are imitations of the divine harmony, in proportion to the degree of perfection that 
they have with respect to their Generator (Leibniz 1989b[1714]: 219).   
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Propelled as it is by our primary thirst for knowledge, this search is guided by 
our vision of the oneness of reality. We strive to know particular data, not in and 
for themselves, but as the only way of gett ing at that oneness. Without reference 
to the whole of being science loses its meaning. With it, on the other hand, even 
the most specialized branches of science are meaningful and alive. Th is oneness 
or wholeness of reality is not to be found in any one place. All I can ever know is 
a particular instance among an endless variety of things. Th us, what determines 
the actual direction of any inquiry is our ability to perpetuate, yet continuously 
to interrelate two elements of thought. One is our will to know the infi nite 
variety and multitude of reality which forever eludes us. Th e other is our actual 
experience of the unity underlying this plurality. Still, that experience of unity 
cannot be had except as we face up to the fragmentary character of the human 
knowledge. ( Jasper 1959[1923]: 21) 
Currently, what seems to be emerging is not so much a nostalgic return to universal 
awareness, but rather the need for a knowledge that arises from the dialogical and 
unbiased “crossing” of diff erent scientifi c experiences from the natural sciences to the 
humanities. It is what Roman Jakobson (1971[1967]: 655) calls “interdisciplinary 
teamwork”, specifying that this approach should be based on “two complementary 
notions – autonomy and integration”, which sometimes can “divert to a wrong end: 
either the salutary idea of autonomy degenerates into an isolationist bias, noxious 
as any parochialism, separatism, and apartheid, or one takes the opposite path and 
compromises the sound prin ciple of integration by substituting a meddlesome 
heteronomy (alias “colo nialism”) for the indispensable autonomy” ( Jakobson 
1971[1967]: 656). Th is vision is confi rmed also by Edgar Morin’s epistemological 
concept of unitas multiplex, by virtue of which the whole and the parts, the unity and 
the multiplicity maintain a double but reciprocal identity, allowing both autonomy 
and integration in a wider vision of science (Morin 1982[1977]; 2007).       
Unity and thirst for knowledge in Lotman. 
Following in Leibniz’s footsteps
In this perspective, Lotman stands out. For him, semiotic science off ers itself as 
one of the possible antidotes contributing to interdisciplinary dialogue, proposing 
itself as a possible path towards a complex understanding of reality based on the 
multifaceted unifi cation of perspectives. 
Lotman’s 1974 essay “Artistic ensemble as daily space”, which seemingly con templates 
the uni-multiple dynamics of the arts, actually provides the model for a deeper under-
standing of his concept of cultural polyglotism (or cultural unitas multiplex). 
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Lotman (1998[1974]: 23) opens the essay10 with the following words:
Ancient myths claim that the Muses danced in a circle [chorovod]. Since every 
Muse possessed her own name, image, instrument and special art, the Greeks 
saw unfailingly a circle in Art, a wholeness of diff erent but mutually necessary 
aspects proper to artistic activities. However, in modernity, the study of art 
took a diff erent path. Separate disciplines for the studying of lett ers, theatre, 
fi gurative arts, cinema, music were created with each developing in isolation 
from the others. Th is approach had its own reasons. For one, it corresponded 
to artistic trends toward diff erentiation, namely the division in separated and 
internally independent spheres of artistic activity (a trend that was noticeable 
in the artistic development of the post-Renaissance and, above all, in the 19th 
century); for another, it allowed to highlight the specifi c aims of the study of 
every fi eld of artistic human activity. 
In order to explain how two diff erent ways of expressing reality – unity and hetero-
geneity – can be in a successful dialogue, Lotman off ers the fascinating image of 
the Muses’ circle dance. According to him, this allegorical confi gu ration not only 
expresses the uni-diversity of art in Ancient Greece, but also off ers a general symbolic 
form of the unrecognized and underlying nature of modernity’s knowledge, which 
is simultaneously particular and indivisible, plural and whole in Jaspers’s words.11        
What seems to interest Lotman in using the paradigm of artistic creativity is the 
fact that, in order to penetrate and understand the oneness of a cultural reality in 
an organic and unifi ed way, many ways of expressing this reality are necessary. Th is 
must include the fact that these ways are autonomous, irreducible to one other, 
almost untranslatable yet reciprocally indispensable. Lotman (1998[1974]: 32) 
writes, referring to art:  
[…] what interests us is not whether the general features of artworks, pictures, 
sculptures, poetic texts, furniture, or clothes can be ascribed to a particular style, 
but whether it is characteristic of any style to manifest itself through the features 
of diff erent genres. Exactly the diversity of the principles of assimilation of the 
world makes the various features of art reciprocally indispensable. […] diff erent 
arts model the same objects in diff erent ways and give an indispensable scope, 
or artistic polyglotism, to artistic thought. But at the same time, every feature of 
10 Th e essay’s title itself summarizes the concept of uni-multiplicity that we are here touching 
upon. Silvia Burini and Alessandro Niero (1998: 35, footnote) do not fail to stress that the 
Russian word ansambl’ contains in itself the idea of a confl uence of diff erences within complex 
interrelationships. 
11 In other words, the cultural richness springs from a vision of a world modelled on the visual 
arts, literature and music as much as on mathematics, logic and physics.    
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art, by virtue of the full aware ness of its specifi city, requires the presence of 
other arts and of parallel artistic languages. 
Lotman is deeply involved in the richness of reality and the ways through which 
man can elucidate this irreducible variety of objects and their plurality of thoughts. 
Th e paradox of human gnoseologic activity is that individuals, no less than societies, 
are seldom satisfi ed with a single way of expressing (or modelling) their reality, such 
as through a single art or by a single artistic text.12 Instead, they need to inform 
their reality through multiple structures of thought – unitary and autonomous, 
but analogically related to one another. In this essay, Lotman emphasizes that 
languages’ capability to model the same, whole world, i.e., to mirror it entirely from 
diff erent points of view (iconic, musical, logic-symbolic, etc.), means that these 
multiple structures of thought, with their own language, are somehow equivalent or 
analogous – as the Leibnizian monads, we could say. 
Th e fi rst complete statement of this kind of mirroring dynamics between world 
and its objects13 is found in the essay “Culture as collective mind and the problems 
of artifi cial intelligence” (1977). In this essay, Lotman underlines in a markedly 
cybernetic terminology that the world14 is a supra-complex system constituted by 
cultural individualities, each of them organized around its own language and its own 
model of the world15 – the sciences are a paradigmatic example of this because they 
are internally structured according to the episteme that individualizes them.16 Th ese 
autonomous individualities, how ever, stand in a relation of similarity with each 
other. Th e culture, being a meta-individuality with its own meta-language,17 actually 
exceeds its compo nents, imprinting upon them a singular identity, namely that of 
its unity. In this way, these individualities within the Individuality, though diff erent 
from one another, are yet similar, since they have in common the same identity of 
the whole, once again relating like Leibiniz’s monads. Th us, individualities are always 
12 Moreover, by virtue of this intertextual dynamics – oft en resulting in the phenomenon 
of syncretism – the artistic text gives rise to the idea that future times are already present and 
condensed in cultural texts, in form of potentialities. Th is refers again to the monad, where “the 
present is pregnant with the future” (Leibniz 1989b[1714]: 216). Cf. also footnote 23.    
13 Th e dynamics of this world are of a whole like its objects (the mirrors of the world) and 
simultaneously parts (individual fragments).
14 Th is world is known by the subject, i.e. in its semiotized form of a culture-organism (from 
1984 the latt er will be called semiosphere). 
15 Cultural individuality is “a closed immanent world with its own internal structural-semiotic 
organization, its own memory, individual behaviour, intellectual capacities, and procedure for 
self-development” (Lotman 1979[1977]: 91). 
16 Obviously these individualities are in turn articulated internally in complex ways.
17 According to Lotman, meta-language is the process of self-description made by a culture 
when it arrives at a certain, mature stage of its development. 
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in a relationship of reciprocal translation,18 namely in a constant dia logue with one 
another, but at the same time they do not tend towards schizophrenia because they 
are bounded by the “circle” of cultural unity. 
We can fi nd the same vision of the interconnection between the individual and 
the universal in “Culture and organism” (1984), a work that, having abandoned the 
cybernetic terminology, is proposed as a prelude of the organicistic turn made by 
Lotman in the 1980s and summarized in the famous essay “On the semiosphere” 
(1984): a space full of interconnected texts that clearly recalls Leibniz’s plenum, 
being the “tissue” composed according to a logic of infi nite textual dividedness 
(Leibniz 1989b[1714], thesis 65). In “Culture and organism”, Lotman starts with the 
consideration that the world (or universe) is supported by a structural unity and, by 
virtue of this unifying principle, “at the various levels of [its] organization, each and 
every aspect of matt er has to reveal features of isomorphism”; and, Lotman continues: 
“from a certain point of view, it would be desirable to describe everything using an 
only meta-language” (Lotman 1985[1984]: 77).19 With the word “isomorphism” (or 
structural unity) Lotman intends to say that culture shows a particular property, for 
which even very distant cultural bodies produce eff ects on one another in the cultural 
universe – this since they are in a permanent state of inter-communication by analogy 
with the whole: the reason for which the search of a meta-language is so important.20   
Th is interpretation is evidenced by an essay dated 1989, “Culture as a subject 
and an object in itself ” (1989), where Lotman talks about the “monad” in order 
to explain the relationship between the individual and the universal. According 
to Lotman, culture can be defi ned as a universe constituted by multiple universes 
that refl ect the same characteristics – defi niteness, self-suffi  ciency and presence of 
borders. By virtue of culture’s capacity for self-refl ection and self-description, which 
contains in itself all of its particular descriptions, these universes (or monads) are in 
a relationship of convergence and tend to create an “integrated wholeness”, namely 
18 Lotman (1979[1977]: 93) emphasizes that translation is not an univocal transfor mation, 
but rather an approximate model, a resemblance, a metaphor. In this sense, the analogical 
mechanisms stand out as a fundamental gnoseologic tool, creating relationships, by similitude, 
of very diff erent realities. 
 In order to make an in-depth analysis of the rule of analogy in the sciences see Hesse 1954, 
1966.  
19 Th is topic is broadly developed by Lotman in Unpredictable Mechanisms of Culture, in 
particular in the chapters “A thinking structure” and “In place of a conclusion”.
20 Th is refers again to Leibniz’s vision of the plenum, summarized in his reference to Hippo-
crates, (Leibniz 1989b[1714], thesis 61): “[T]his communication [among bodies] extends to 
any distance whatsoever. As a result, every body is aff ected by everything that happens in the 
universe, to such an extent that he who sees all can read in each thing what happens everywhere, 
and even what has happened or what will happen, by observing in the present what is remote in 
time as well as in space. “All things conspire [sympnoia panta]” said Hippocrates”.   
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an antonymic unity in which diff erent languages and diff erent visions of the world 
are integrated in the cultural meta-language. It so happens that every monad, every 
cultural personality seems “like a decimal number obsessed by the idea of becoming 
a whole” (Lotman 1997[1989]: 12) – so a fundamentally self-referential whole 
but, at the same time, as a part of the whole-culture, every monad can only be in a 
relationship of translation with other monads. 
Th is semantic “touch” of heterogeneous universes gives life to a fruitful 
mechanism of metaphorogenesis or infi nite production of meaning by analogy, 
since translation is not an equivalence but a similarity.21 
It is not diffi  cult to understand why interdisciplinary dialogue in the sciences is of 
utmost importance to Lotman. First of all, the dialogue correlates the sciences in the 
light of the unity of human culture by expressing itself through diff erent scientifi c 
visions of the world, making from them a single, unitary intellectual fi eld of relational 
experience. Secondly, interdisciplinary dialogue maintains the specifi c identity 
of each science, namely of every single personality, or monad. Lastly, it produces 
the emergence of a fundamental feature of knowledge – namely its relational and 
collective nature.22 Knowledge results from a “touch”, an imperfect translation, 
that needs to interpolate itself through models founded on analogy (or similarity), 
sources of great heuristic creativity and linguistic-scientifi c metaphorogenesis. 
Th e above refl ections may help toward an understanding why the research of a 
common scientifi c language (meta-language) and the return to the “unifi ed structure 
of knowledge” was so important for Lotman. According to him, the ideal unity is 
a contradiction of reality, which is anything but abstractly mono-perspective: its 
scientifi c modelling, as he suggests in Culture and Explosion (Lotman 2009[1992]: 
24), must be based on the real dynamics of languages, always irreducible to one 
another but fatally and reciprocally necessary. Indeed he talks about “erroneous 
abstraction” when scientifi c modelling, as disem bodied abstraction from reality, 
tends to be empty, distorting and utopian metaphorism, namely, creating a synthetic 
unity of diff erences, in which these are pragmatically reset.
As seen with the theological meta-knowledge that characterized the birth of 
Medieval universitas as meta-language, Lotman intends to search for a scientifi c 
language able to integrally unify the understanding of reality, placing in correlation 
the diff erent forms of knowledge that bring along their own specifi c languages 
21 In Unpredictable Mechanisms of Culture, the production of metaphors is one of the features of 
the “explosion”, which characterizes the creative processes of meaning (art and science).  
22 As Th omas Kuhn (1977, 1979) observed the construction of theories and models always 
occurs through a lexicon, thanks to which the scientifi c community can recognize relationships 
of analogy among objects of reality, already categorized by the collective linguistic fi ltration.  
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and theoretical apparatuses. In this way, epistemological and metho dological 
particularities are not abandoned.23 
Th e Aristotelian-Th omistic concept of a “unifi ed structure of knowledge” is in 
this way returned to contemporary thought and rediscovered in its actua lity.24 It 
emerges as a heuristic habitus,25 although in Lotman it is enriched by an eminently 
ethical character that aims to realize an open and intrinsically correlated science, 
never limited by a particular model of knowledge.26 In this perspective, it is almost 
inevitable that Lotmanian semiotics results in an interdisciplinary dialogue and 
scientifi c polyglotism, being built entirely on the recognition of otherness as a 
“wayward comet in a calculated orbit” (Lotman 1994[1993]: 31). It is also built 
on the value of the new that always comes from the external world – another 
man, another thought, another scientifi c apparatus, another cultural system – 
and confi gurates itself as unpredictable and a creator of discovery. Th e dialogue 
dismantles what Lotman famously calls “the own”, that is, in this case, the calculated 
and self-suffi  cient orbit of the diff erent scientifi c disciplines.
23 Jakobson writes: “[E]qual att ention must be paid to the specifi cs in the structure and develop-
ment of any given province of knowledge and, furthermore, to their common foundations and 
developmental lines as well as to their mutual dependence” ( Jakobson 1971[1967]: 656).
24 Th is rediscovery characterized more broadly the contemporary epistemology. Lotman was 
in fact well aware of the structural transformations (summarized in the paradigm switch of the 
so-called “Second Scientifi c Revolution”) which were taking place in the world of sciences 
during those years. Th is is inferable from his introduction to the 1973 book Ricerche semiotiche. 
Nuove tendenze delle scienze umane nell’URSS [Semiotic research: New tendencies of the humanities 
in the USSR], in which he affi  rms, together with Uspenskij, that semiotics: (1) is a meta-knowing 
science because it expands the understanding of the knowledge, beyond the common sense; (2) 
is a relativizing science because it helps to clarify the semio-linguistic implications that underlie 
the scientifi c constructions (Lotman, Uspenskij 1973: xiii–xiv). 
25 In this way, Lotman brings to maturity the interdisciplinary tension that had characterized 
the lines of research of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics since the beginning, even if these 
were deeply anchored in the hard sciences – a tendency evident also in Lotman’s early writings. 
Th is path is well summed up by Vladimir E. Alexandrov (2000: 341–342) who comments: 
“Lotman’s commitment to scientism – to a humanistic scholarship dedicated to the ideal of 
objectivity, but tempered by a clear sense of the inescapable vagaries of human experience – 
remained constant throughout his long and distinguished career. What changed was the kind 
of science on which he relied, in some of his earlier writings, he used concepts from physics and 
mathematics, experimented with algebraic formulations of “textual entropy”, and considered 
applying cybernetics to literary studies. However, he subsequently abandoned these “hard” 
sciences, and, as the semiosphere essay shows, shift ed to certain branches of biology and geology, 
sciences that he appears to have believed are more appropriate to culturology because they are 
“soft er”, more descriptive, and more integrative than analytical mathematical-physical ones”. 
26 Th e work on language becomes therefore indispensable in an ethical-argumentative 
perspective, as does the work on discursive apparatuses of sciences. 
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Семиотика и интердисциплинарность: наследие Юрия Лотмана
Одним из краеугольных камней семиотической теории Лотмана является утверж дение, 
что для понимания процессов культурной динамики языка одной отдельной науки будет 
недостаточно. В своей последней книге “Непредсказуемые механизмы культуры” Лотман 
подчеркивает, что перед наукой открывается перспектива единства методик, применяемых 
в гуманитарных и точных науках при изучении разных аспектов окружающего нас мира .
Целью данной статьи является рассмотрение отношения Лотмана к идеям науки, 
научности и методу интердисциплинарности, опираясь на его размышления о важ ности 
возврата к проблемам, волновавшим уже Аристотеля и средневековую науку, – к единой 
структуре научного знания. 
Semiootika ja interdistsiplinaarsus: Lotmani pärand
Üheks Juri Lotmani semiootikateooria konkreetseks aspektiks on kahtlemata tunnista mine, et 
kultuurilisele dünaamikale aluseks olevaid protsesse pole võimalik mõista, kui võtt a kasutusele 
üksainuke teaduslik keel.
Oma viimases teoses “Ennustamatud kultuurimehhanismid” rõhutab Lotman, et loodus- 
ja humanitaarteadustel tuleb püüelda ühildamatu ühtsuse poole sügava meta keelelise dialoogi 
kaudu. See saab toimuda üksnes arvestades selle antinoomiate tegelikkust, või teadvustades 
paljusust keelte seas, mille vastastikuseks eesmärgiks on väljendada objektide tegelikku, 
heterogeenset ning vastuolulist liikumist. Siit Lotmani ett epanek (mis on ühtlasi tema eetiline 
pärand), et tuleks tagasi pöörduda Aristotelese polühedraalse teaduste ühtsuse juurde.
Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on vaadata üle Lotmani suhe teaduse, teaduslikkuse ning 
interdistsiplinaarse meetodi ideedega, rõhutades tema viimaseid mõtisklusi sellest, kui oluline 
on pöörduda tagasi teadmise ühtsustatud, aristotelesliku struktuuri juurde või teaduse sellise 
kuju juurde, milles autonoomsetena üheskoos eksisteerivad erinevad ning mitt e kunagi täielikult 
vastastikku tõlgitavad teaduskeeled, mis ühtlasi on omavahel dialoogis.
